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Summary 
Almost exactly four years ago, on 21 November 2006, the European Commission released 
a so-called non-paper entitled “What the EU could bring to Belarus” In this document, 
the EU offered Belarus several political, technical and infrastructural possibilities for 
cooperation, under the condition that Minsk improves the situation of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, including the right to free and fair elections and free media. An 
overview of the last four years of the EU-Belarus relationship is more than relevant today, 
coming as it does shortly after the presidential elections in Belarus – which has been re-
scheduled to take place on 19 December 2010, earlier than the regular date – and four 
years after the release of the non-paper. 
It is a well known fact that the relationship with the EU is not of primary importance 
for the Minsk leadership, but is regarded rather as a political tool to counter-balance the 
overwhelming influence of Russia. The Russian factor not only affects the foreign and 
security policy of Belarus, but also has a decisive influence on its foreign trade patterns. In 
other words, the shift in Belarusian foreign policy in a more pro-EU direction, which has 
been taking place since 2007, is connected with the changing attitude of Russia towards 
Belarus, and is not an indigenous, domestically motivated move. However, the Belarusian 
leadership has always been reluctant to commit itself too much to the EU, especially when 
it comes to democratic values. Instead, Minsk has been striving to narrow EU-Belarus 
relations down to cooperation on foreign trade, investments, infrastructure, visa issues, 
etc. – in other words, primarily to technical issues. 
Taking into account the EU’s intentions as described in the non-paper, this strategy of 
managing EU-Belarus relations over the last 4 to 5 years has been largely, though not fully 
successful from the perspective of the Belarusian regime. On the one hand, the 
relationship with the EU has clearly improved in recent years: Belarus was included in the 
Eastern Partnership initiative, the visa ban on Belarusian leaders was by and large 
suspended, investments from the EU are growing, foreign trade is intensifying, more and 
more new loans are being received from the West etc. On the other hand, the regime has 
managed to avoid introducing any significant reforms that would have affected the core 
structures of the political system in terms of democratic and human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. Despite the EU’s increasing engagement towards Belarus, the 
nature of the regime has practically remained the same since the last presidential elections 
in 2006.  
The lack of significant changes in this field can easily be confirmed by using 
quantitative indicators such as the Democracy Index of the Economist Intelligence Unit, 
or the “Freedom in the World” indicator compiled by Freedom House. Studying 
quantitative indicators might well lead to the conclusion that the EU’s policy towards 
Belarus has seemingly failed in terms of protecting and fostering human rights and civil 
freedoms. This as well demonstrated by the brutal suppression of the opposition 
demonstration following the 19 December 2010 election. 
However, other quantitative sources, such as the Index of Economic Freedom of the 
Heritage Foundation and various indicators of the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
II 
Development show that the regime has actually changed in recent years to a quite 
significant extent in terms of economic freedoms such as banking, privatization, trade and 
investment policy etc. The motivation for such changes is connected to the fact that 
sustaining social stability is of crucial importance for the Belarusian leadership. Social 
stability is the factor which has ensured strong domestic support for the Lukashenko 
system over the last decade. Minsk has been in growing need of external sources of 
funding since the oil and gas price war on the eve of 2006/2007. The government 
introduced several measures to intensify foreign trade and attract more investments, and 
to obtain more and more external loans and credits.  
The paper argues that more emphasis should be put on economic transformation 
within the framework of the conditionality approach of the EU. The main reason for this 
is that the Lukashenko regime has shown practically no signs of cooperation in terms of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. The policy of the regime has remained largely 
unchanged in these areas over the last four years. On the other hand, Minsk has already 
conducted a number of significant economic reforms, and others are on the way. The 
government had the best motivation to do so: by liberalizing the national economy it 
intends to counter-balance the growing influence of Russia and maintain the level of 
social stability that guarantees the regime’s domestic legitimacy. Belarus is striving to 
attract Western investors, obtain loans, and increase incomes by privatizing certain 
elements of the still largely state-dominated national economy. All in all, while the regime 
is not at all cooperative in terms of human rights, there is a definite readiness for reforms 
in the field of the economy. Consequently, fostering economic transformation could be 
the main entry point for the EU’s foreign policy towards Belarus. 
Focusing on the economy relations would also allow the EU to introduce such 
sanctions against the Lukashenko regime that would be much more painful, than the ones 
adopted on 31 January 2011. Indeed, economy is the point, where the EU could motivate 
Belarus, either in a positive way (by supporting economic reforms), or in a negative way 
(by introducing economic sanctions that would cause immediate and serious losses of 
incomes). 
The human rights dialogue should, of course, not be abandoned, since protecting 
human rights and fundamental freedoms is a core value of the European Union as a 
whole, including its Neighbourhood Policy. This is particularly necessary following the 19 
December 2010 events. However, strategic efforts should be concentrated more on the 
broader economic sphere. All in all, conditionality has not failed as a strategy towards 
Belarus, but should become more balanced. Instead of a solely human rights and 
democracy-dominated approach, in the long run EU conditionality should focus also on 
economic and administrative aspects. Such a shift could be applied also if the EU decides 
to introduce additional, stronger sanctions. All in all, also economic tools should be used 
for protecting human rights. 
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 1.  Introduction1 
Slightly more than four years ago, on 21 November 2006, the European Commission 
released a so-called non-paper entitled What the EU could bring to Belarus2 In this 
document, the EU offered Belarus several political, technical and infrastructural 
possibilities for cooperation, under the condition that Minsk improves the situation of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the right to free and fair elections and 
free media. An overview of the last four years of the EU-Belarus relationship is more than 
relevant today, coming as it does shortly after the next presidential elections in Belarus – 
which has been re-scheduled to take place on 19 December 2010, earlier than the regular 
date – and four years after the release of the non-paper. Another new phenomenon is that 
high-ranking EU politicians have recently visited Minsk and met Alexandr Lukashenko 
personally. These visitors include the Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaité in October 
2010 and the German and Polish Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Guido Westerwelle and 
Radosław Sikorski, both in November. In addition to these, the sanctions introduced by 
the EU on Belarus on 31 January 20113 make a comprehensive overview even more actual. 
It is a well known fact that the relationship with the EU is not of primary importance 
for the leadership in Minsk, but is regarded rather as a political tool to counter-balance 
the overwhelming influence of Russia. The Russian factor not only affects the foreign and 
security policy of Belarus, but also has a decisive influence on its foreign trade patterns. In 
other words, the shift in Belarusian foreign policy in a more pro-EU direction, which has 
been taking place since 2007, is connected with the changing attitude of Russia towards 
Belarus, and is not an indigenous, domestically motivated move. Belarusian analyst Vitali 
Silitski linked this move to the gradual loss of Russian subsidies4 that have kept the 
Belarusian economy running. As Minsk was in great need of alternative sources of 
income, it turned first of all towards Western Europe. However, the Belarusian leadership 
has always been reluctant to commit itself too much to the EU, especially when it comes 
to democratic values. Instead, Minsk has been striving to narrow EU-Belarus relations 
down to cooperation on foreign trade, investments, infrastructure, visa issues, etc. – in 
other words, primarily to technical issues. As EU accession has not been on the agenda of 
the Belarusian government, and it does not want to spoil its relationship with Russia, this 
 
1  The author would like to express his gratitude to the “European Foreign and Security Policy Studies” 
programme of the Volkswagen Foundation for supporting the work on this report and also to the Peace 
Research Institute Frankfurt that hosted the project. All possible errors in the text are solely the author’s 
responsibility. 
2  “What the EU could bring to Belarus” 21 November 2006. Accessible: http://ec.europa.eu/delegations/ 
belarus/documents/eu_belarus/non_paper_1106.pdf (15.10.2010).  
3  Council Conclusions on Belarus. Council of the European Union, 31 Jan 2011. Accessible: 
www.consilium.europa.eu/ uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/119038.pdf (2.2.2011). 
4  Fischer, Sabine: Executive summary. FISCHER, Sabine (ed.): Back from the Cold? The EU and Belarus in 
2009. Chaillot Papers No. 119. Paris, November 2009. EU Institute for Security Studies, p. 10. 
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“balancing act” was a reasonable choice of behaviour – though, as we will see, its 
sustainability is becoming more and more questionable.  
Taking into account the EU’s intentions as described in the non-paper, this strategy of 
managing EU-Belarus relations over the last 4 to 5 years has been largely, though not fully 
successful from the perspective of the Belarusian regime. On the one hand, the 
relationship with the EU has clearly improved in recent years: Belarus was included in the 
Eastern Partnership initiative, the visa ban on Belarusian leaders was by and large 
suspended, investments from the EU are growing, foreign trade is intensifying, more and 
more new loans are being received from the West, etc. On the other hand, the regime has 
managed to avoid introducing any significant reforms that would have affected the core 
structures of the political system in terms of democratic and human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. Though a number of changes were introduced in compliance with 
EU demands, these were not of a structural nature but were only temporary. For example, 
not using force against an opposition demonstration on one occasion does not mean that 
no force will be used in the future, as long as the legal environment has not been changed 
in a way that bans the use of force against all peaceful demonstrations – and this is not the 
case. The lack of any structural improvement was well illustrated by the brutal 
suppression of the opposition protest that followed the 19 December 2010 presidential 
elections. 
Despite the EU’s increasing engagement towards Belarus, the nature of the regime has 
practically remained the same since the 2006 presidential elections. The system did not 
comply with the International Labour Organization’s (ILO) recommendations, despite 
the suspension of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) in 2007. As the 2010 
presidential elections approached, repression of opposition groups was once again 
increasing. Although the regime released political prisoners in 2008, people are currently 
once again being imprisoned for political reasons. Moreover, the “regular” harassment of 
opposition activists and the use of administrative resources against politicians of the 
opposition continue; and there has been no improvement in electoral standards. Neither 
the parliamentary elections in September 2008, nor the municipal elections in April 2010 
were more democratic than any of the previous elections held over the last 15 years. Not a 
single candidate of the opposition has managed to gain a seat either in parliament or in 
the municipal elections. As the 2010 presidential elections approached, political violence 
was once again on the rise: Oleg Bebenin, founder and editor of perhaps the best known 
opposition website, Charter97.org, was found dead at his home on 3 September 2010 and 
the hurriedly released result of the official inquiry that spoke about suicide leaves many 
question marks. These negative tendencies reached their peak with the suppression of the 
opposition protest on 19 December 2011 and the imprisonment of more than 600 
opposition activists, including two presidential candidates. 
Considering this lack of positive developments, one may easily come to the conclusion 
that the EU’s original, conditionality-based approach to fostering human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in Belarus, as described in the non-paper, has clearly failed. Even 
the recent intensification of the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood Policy following the August 
2008 war in Georgia has not changed this situation, as Belarus did not reciprocate the 
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EU’s increased commitment. However, as the European Security Strategy states, the EU is 
interested in having “a ring of well-governed countries” around it. This leads us to the 
research question: Since human rights-based conditionality has produced no tangible 
results, what could be a more effective entry point for the EU’s foreign policy to engage 
Belarus and to improve the political situation there? How could the EU make Belarus 
become more integrated in this “ring of well-governed countries”? The importance of this 
question got further increased by the introduction of the mentioned EU sanctions on 31 
January 2011, namely the travel ban and assets freeze against more than 150 Belarusian 
officials. Finding a more effective foreign policy entry point would also enable the EU to 
introduce more effective sanctions, if needed.  
This paper argues that more emphasis should be put on economic transformation 
within the framework of the EU’s conditionality approach. The main reason for this is 
that the Lukashenko regime has demonstrated practically no cooperativeness at all in 
terms of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Over the last four years, the regime has 
remained grossly unchanged in these areas. On the other hand, Minsk has already 
conducted a number of significant economic reforms, and others are underway. The 
government had the best motivation to do so: by liberalizing the national economy, it 
intends to counter-balance the growing influence of Russia. Belarus is striving to attract 
Western investors, obtain loans, and increase incomes by privatizing certain elements of 
the still largely state-dominated national economy. Generally speaking, while the regime 
is not at all cooperative in terms of human rights, it shows a definite readiness for reforms 
in the field of the economy. Consequently, fostering economic transformation could be 
the main entry point for the EU’s foreign policy towards Belarus. 
The first chapter will take a look at the last four years of political contacts between the 
EU and Belarus. The task is to map out not only the various EU initiatives regarding 
Belarus but also the answers and reactions given by the regime. Particular attention is 
dedicated to the consequences of the war in Georgia in August 2008, which resulted in an 
upgrading of the relationship with Belarus by the EU. The earlier policy of isolation was 
replaced by a policy of engagement. This was the main reason why Belarus was finally 
included in the Eastern Partnership initiative. Since then, there has been no significant 
progress on the political level; even the Eastern Partnership only generated moderate 
results. The only exception is the NGO sector, where improvements are remarkable due 
to the activities of the Civil Society Forum. However, one must add that these 
achievements are only partially linked to the efforts of the EU as such, but rather to the 
initiatives of individual Member States. In addition to all these factors, the chapter will 
briefly analyse the role of the EU’s technical assistance programmes as tools for further 
engagement.  
The second chapter studies the role of the EU as an economic partner of Belarus. 
Besides mapping out the trends of foreign trade, loans and credit programmes, special 
attention is paid to the role of the EU (and of individual EU countries) on the Belarusian 
investment market, particularly in terms of foreign direct investments (FDI). The 
emerging problem is that while Belarus has been trying to liberalize its economy in order 
to attract foreign – preferably Western – investors and to thus reduce its economic 
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dependency on Russia, in fact it is Russian capital that dominates the Belarusian 
investment market. First Vice Prime Minister Vladimir Semashko already warned in 
February 2008 that “Russian business wants to buy everything it can”5 – and according to 
the analysis of the investment inflow, this trend has strengthened further.  
The EU’s Belarus policies have been studied and analyzed by many researchers, for 
example Gregorz Gromadzki6, Lubos Vesely7 or George Dura.8 However, less attention 
has been paid to the other side, i.e. to the possible interests and motivations of the 
Belarusian side in conducting a relationship with the EU. In this regard, one must rely 
almost exclusively on statements by various Belarusian officials, while only a few experts 
deal with the question, for example, Vitali Silitski9, Dzianis Melyantsou10, and Kyrill 
Koktysh.11 This report therefore endeavours to study the relationship between the EU and 
Belarus not only from an EU perspective, but also from that of Belarus. 
When performing such a task, one has to bear in mind that it is fundamentally wrong 
to picture Belarus as a unified, monolithic entity that follows the single and consistent will 
of one political leader. From the methodological perspective, one has to separate Minsk’s 
official foreign policy from the foreign policy of the opposition forces, which are in fact 
also far from being unified. Such a separation is particularly necessary because the EU 
also deals with these forces separately, as do the Member States. However, emphasis is 
placed here on official Belarusian foreign policy, because it is the current president and 
the government who are the EU’s main cooperation partners, and not the divided – not 
even always institutionalized – opposition forces. Nevertheless, some attention will, of 
course, be paid to the civil society sector as well. 
The complex and problematic question of the Belarus-Russia relationship is only 
addressed in this report to the extent required for understanding the context of the role of 
the EU in Belarusian foreign policy. Thus, patterns of foreign trade and foreign direct 
investments are studied extensively, while questions of, for instance, energy transit receive 
less attention. 
 
5  Syamashka: “Russian business wants to buy everything it can”. Accessible: 
http://charter97.org/en/news/2008/2/21/4060/ (15.10.2010).  
6  Gromadzki, Grzegorz: Belarusian foreign policy – change or continuity? Fischer, Sabine (ed.): Back from 
the Cold? The EU and Belarus in 2009. Chaillot Papers No. 119. Paris, November 2009. EU Institute for 
Security Studies, p. 93-104. 
7  Veselý, Luboš: The European Union and the Support of Democratic Changes in Belarus – Acts or Words? 
International Issues & Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs. Vol. XV. No. 2. 2006, p. 37-45.  
8  Dura, George: The EU´s Limited Response to Belarus´ Pseudo ´New Foreign Policy´. CEPS Policy Brief. 
No. 151. February 2008. Accessible: www.ceps.eu/ceps/download/1429 (12.10.2010). 
9  Hajduk, Kirill – Silitski, Vitali: After the GSP Withdrawal: the Case for the Revision of the EU Policy 
Towards Belarus. Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies. 7 Aug 2007. 6. p. Accessible: 
www.belinstitute.eu/images/stories/documents/gspaug7en.pdf (16.10.2010).  
10  Melyantsou, Dzianis: Eastern Partnership: The First Year. BISS Blitz. Belarusian Institute for Strategic 
Studies. 16 May 2010. Accessible: www.belinstitute.eu/images/doc-pdf/bb022010en.pdf (15.10.2010). 
11 Koktysh, Kirill: „The Belarusian Policy of Russia: the Era of Pragmatism.” In: International Issues & Slovak 
Foreign Policy Affairs. Vol. XV. No. 2. 2006, p. 18-29.  
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2.  From isolation to engagement: the EU as a political partner of 
Belarus 2006-2010 
2.1  The early years and the era of isolation 
In the early nineties, relations between the European Community, later European Union, 
and Belarus were promising. Diplomatic relations were established in August 1992 and 
negotiations with the European Commission on a Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement (PCA) began in Brussels in November 1993. The PCA was signed on 6 March 
1995. The Belarusian side was represented by Alexandr Lukashenko, who was 
democratically elected President of Belarus in 1994. The Belarusian parliament already 
ratified the cooperation agreement on 12 April 1995. However, Lukashenko quickly 
transformed Belarus into a highly authoritarian, dictatorial state. Following the fraudulent 
referendum on modifying the Belarusian constitution, the European Parliament 
condemned the developments in Belarus in December 1996 and initiated appropriate 
steps. Suggestions included suspending the ratification of the PCA and terminating all 
TACIS (Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States) projects, 
except those aimed at supporting democracy and freedom of the media. Finally, on 15 
September 1997, the Council decided to suspend the PCA ratification process and 
terminated the TACIS and TEMPUS projects, with the few exceptions mentioned above.  
However, the Belarusian regime was not excessively embarrassed by these 
developments. In terms of foreign policy, the country’s Russian orientation once again 
became dominant. This was mostly due to the strong ties “inherited” from the former 
Soviet Union era. Belarus remains a key transit country for Russian energy deliveries to 
the West, as approximately 20% of Russian natural gas and 50% of the oil exports are 
transported via Belarus. These transit revenues, the heavily subsidized prices of Russian 
energy, and extensive arms exports12 meant that the Lukashenko regime was not only able 
to produce impressive GDP growth, but also managed to preserve most of the social 
benefits of the Soviet era. As a result, and with the help of his firm grip on the media, 
Lukashenko continued to enjoy high public support until very recently, a fact that is also 
confirmed by independent think tanks. At the same time, repressive measures against the 
opposition increased, including a few cases involving the disappearance of key opposition 
politicians and journalists in 1999/2000. 
The suspension of the PCA did not at all unsettle the Belarusian leadership: the EU 
was perceived as being geographically remote and uninteresting. During this period, 
Minsk merely regarded the EU as a source of humanitarian funds and aid programmes. 
Belarus had already started to receive various types of aid in 1992, first from the EC and 
then from the EU. The range and overall value of aid programmes and grants decreased 
 
12  In the late ’90s Belarus was among the world’s ten largest arms exporters. Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers 
Database. Accessible: www.sipri.org/research/armaments/transfers/databases/armstransfers (16.10.2010). 
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significantly following the authoritarian turnaround in 1994/95, in line with the above 
mentioned Council decision. However, Belarus’s main humanitarian problem, which is 
also of international significance, namely the management of the consequences of the 
1986 Chernobyl disaster, has always remained an exception: the EU continued to support 
such programmes even in the years of isolation. Implementation of EU aid and assistance 
programmes was further hindered by the fact that Belarus suspended tax exemption for 
the TACIS projects in 2002/2003, and also set up a complicated registration procedure for 
all EU programmes to be implemented in Belarus. 
EU-Belarus relations worsened further following the parliamentary elections and a 
referendum held in 2004 that allowed Lukashenko to stand for presidency for an 
unlimited number of times. The elections were not only heavily fraudulent, but they were 
also accompanied by numerous cases of brutal violence against opposition activists and 
politicians. In reply, the EU issued a visa ban on six Belarusian officials who were held 
responsible for the violent dispersal of the opposition demonstrations as well as for the 
disappearances mentioned above. 
The activism of the European Union was connected to the fact that Eastern 
enlargement had already become reality. Belarus with its dictatorial, non-transparent 
regime had thus become a direct neighbour of the EU. As enlargement approached, the 
EU started to address the region that “came closer”: the first step was the “Wider Europe” 
document in 2003, followed by the European Neighbourhood Policy launched one year 
later. However, both documents stressed that Belarus could not become a fully fledged 
partner of the EU due to its anti-democratic system and the lack of a PCA.  
2.1.1  The sanctions that followed the 2006 presidential elections 
The 2006 presidential elections, which was yet again anti-democratic, ended once more 
with a victory for Lukashenko. The candidate of the United Democratic Forces, Alexandr 
Milinkievich, officially received less than 5% of the votes. The opposition demonstration 
that started on the eve of the elections was again forcibly dispersed after a few days. 
Several opposition activists were sentenced to short or medium terms of imprisonment; 
students were expelled from their universities because of political activism, etc. The EU 
decided to intensify its pressure on Belarus in order to foster human rights and 
democratic freedoms. However, it intended to do so without harming the Belarusian 
population. Some new Member States, particularly Poland and Lithuania, were highly 
supportive of this approach.  
The first step was to widen the visa ban that had already been in force since 2004. 
Several officials were added to the list in 2006. They were held responsible either for 
the pre-election irregularities or for the violent treatment of opposition activists 
following the voting. The visa ban list at the time contained 31 names, including that 
of Alexandr Lukashenko himself.13 The aim of the ban was two-fold: first to put 
 
13  GAERC Press Release No. 8219. 10-11th April, 2006. P. 12. Accessible: 
www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/89219.pdf. (19.10.2010). 
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pressure on the leaders themselves, and second, to discredit the regime in the eyes of 
the ordinary people.14  
In addition, on 19 May 2006, the EU decided to freeze the assets of 36 Belarusian 
leaders held in European banks.15 Although the measure sounded impressive at first, 
especially after it was joined by the United States, it did not have any significant effect in 
real terms. It was finally introduced following a months-long debate; thus the people 
targeted had enough time to transfer their assets elsewhere. Moreover, bank accounts held 
in non-EU banks (including Switzerland, which did not join the ban) were not affected.  
The third element of the sanctions, the suspension of the Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP) was not directly connected with the presidential elections. The 
International Labour Organization (ILO) had already been putting pressure on Belarus 
since 2000 in connection with the limited rights of workers, especially with regard to 
forming trade unions. In December 2006, the Council of the European Union decided to 
suspend the GSP after six months in the event that Belarus did not comply with the ILO 
recommendations. From the 6-month moratorium, it can be seen that the EU hoped to 
change Belarusian behaviour concerning the human rights issues involved, especially 
when one takes into account the already worsening relationship Belarus-Russia at the 
time. For a while, in order to win time, the regime treated the political opposition a bit 
more liberally, but failed to comply significantly with any of the altogether 12 ILO 
recommendations. Thus, as a consequence, the GSP was finally suspended on 21 June 
2007.  
The effectiveness of suspending the GSP generated a great deal of criticism, and not 
only on the Belarusian side. First, as an immediate response, the regime introduced 
several harsh measures against the opposition, such as closing down opposition 
newspapers and tightening its control over the media. Second, the suspension caused 
much less damage than was originally intended, especially as it did not affect oil exports.16 
Third, the regime managed to communicate the measure domestically as if the EU were 
“blackmailing” the Belarusian government and working together with the opposition.17 It 
might well be that this measure actually worsened the image of the EU among the 
Belarusian population. 
 
 
14  EU to extend Belarus visa ban list. Belarus News and Analysis. 21 Sept 2006. Accessible: 
www.data.minsk.by/belarusnews/092006/151.html. (19.10.2010). 
15  EU freezes Belarus leaders’ assets. EurActiv.com 19 May 2006. Accessible: www.euractiv.com/en/east-
mediterranean/eu-freezes-belarus-leaders-assets/article-155434?_print (19.10.2010). 
16  Estimates vary from 30 to 70 million USD loss annually, instead of the planned approx. 300 - 400 million. 
For more information, see Belarus Exclusion from GSP: Possible Repercussions. Belarusian Institute for 
Strategic Studies. 2007. p. 1. Accessible: www.belinstitute.eu/images/stories/documents/ biss_gsp_eng.pdf 
(10.9.2010). 
17  For more information, see: Belarus and the EU: The end of a short-lived romance? Office for a 
Democratic Belarus, 22 August 2007. Accessible: www.democraticbelarus.eu/node/2054 (10.9.2010). 
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2.1.2  “We were standing on one foot, though we need to stand on two” 
The situation changed fundamentally with the Russia-Belarus “gas price war” that took 
place at the turn of 2006/2007. Belarus had constantly had to face the threat of a moderate 
but steady increase in the price of gas since the signing of the agreement covering the 
period 2007 to 2010. Even the cost of the “moderate” increase was high: Belarus had to 
gradually hand over 50% of Beltransgaz, the key gas transit company that controlled the 
gas pipelines crossing the country. Thus not only did the price of gas start to rise, but the 
country’s position as a key gas transit country also began to dwindle. The Russian-
Belarusian relationship has cooled down significantly since the gas price conflict.18 Even 
the current propaganda war between Moscow and Minsk can be traced back to this 
period.  
The Lukashenko regime realized, of course, that it was necessary to normalize relations 
with the West in order to counter-balance Russian dominance. To avoid endangering his 
own rule, Lukashenko started a gradual, cautious opening-up that focused almost 
exclusively on the economy. The first such step actually took place before the Russia-
Belarus gas conflict, in autumn 2006,19 when Russian pressure started to intensify.  
As a first response, the EU issued the non-paper “What could the European Union bring 
to Belarus?” already mentioned. This document set out 12 pre-conditions where the 
Lukashenko regime was to produce considerable improvements. Compliance would open 
up the possibility for Belarus to benefit from the ENP. A supportive EP declaration, also 
adopted in November, stated: “in order to engage in any substantial dialogue with the EU, 
Belarus needs to implement the remaining conditions laid down in the ‘non-paper”. 
On 21 November 2006, Minsk suggested to the EU the start of an “energy dialogue”; and 
December saw the appointment of the first-ever Plenipotentiary Representative of Belarus 
to the EU. The position was given to Sergey Gaydukevich, who – interestingly enough – 
had participated in the March presidential elections as an “opposition” candidate 
“against” Lukashenko. In mid-January, the first high-level Western visit to Belarus took 
place when René van der Linden, President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council 
of Europe, was received in Minsk.20   
The official re-positioning of Belarusian foreign policy took place two weeks later: 
in an interview with the Reuters news agency on 2 February 2007, Lukashenko 
declared that Belarus should become a bridge between Russia and the West, and that 
neglecting the Western dimension was a mistake. As he put it: “We were standing on 
 
18  On the complexity of the Belarus-Russia relationship, see: Belarus and Russia: Friends forever? Belarus 
Analyses, March 2007, Pontis Foundation. Accessible: www.nadaciapontis.sk/tmp/asset_cache/link/ 
0000015995/Belarus%20and%20Russia%20Friends%20Forever.pdf (10.9.2010). 
19  Russia’s Belarus-policies are well illustrated by: KOKTYSH, Kirill: The Belarusian Policy of Russia: the Era 
of Pragmatism. In: International Issues & Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs. Vol. XV. No. 2. 2006, p. 18-29. 
20  Belarus: In Minsk, PACE President Calls For Democratic Change. RFE/RL Belarus Service, 19 Jan 2007. 
Accessible: www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/01/51a681cc-5972-4587-b744-ebd241e75a93.html 
(6.2.2007). 
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one foot, instead of standing on two.” Thus he openly announced the importance of 
improving relations with the West.21 
The announcement was followed by certain steps of goodwill: on 29 March 2007, the 
Belarusian opposition was able to hold a large rally commemorating the presidential 
election of the previous year and no serious police counter-measures were taken. The 
International Helsinki Committee, which had been under pressure from the authorities 
for a long time, had its operational permit extended and, in April, Lukashenko also agreed 
that the European Commission could open its representation in Minsk. 
As a concrete response to the Belarusian offer of an energy dialogue, the EU had 
already started a large-scale technical assistance programme in Belarus in 2006, aimed at 
improving the country’s overall energy security. The significance of this programme is 
easily understandable, taking into account the rapidly rising price of Russian gas. All in 
all, the programme has a budget of 5 million EUR for the period 2007 to 2010.22  
The EU, of course, did not only support the Belarusian regime. Following the 
presidential election, large-scale projects were launched in order to provide the Belarusian 
population with alternative media coverage. In addition, a major EU programme has been 
operational since October 2006 that awards scholarships abroad to Belarusian students 
who have been expelled from their home universities due to political activism. Another 
programme was launched in April 2008 in order to support the European Humanitarian 
University, a Belarusian university-in-exile that operates in neighbouring Vilnius. 
However, no significant improvements took place in the overall relationship between 
the EU and Belarus between early 2007 and mid-2008. Minsk still failed to comply with 
any of the EU’s demands related to human rights and fundamental freedoms. The ad hoc 
liberal measures did not change the structure of the system, and the regime again started 
to use force against the opposition. For instance, in January 2008, opposition activist 
Andrei Kim was arrested for participating in a demonstration and sentenced to one and a 
half years of imprisonment in April. Several other activists were fined or their freedom 
restricted. On 25 March 2008, the police again used extensive violence against opposition 
demonstrators, who were commemorating the 2006 presidential elections. Such measures 
were radically different from the regime’s relatively peaceful attitude towards the same 
demonstration a year earlier and again marked the lack of any substantial change in the 
behaviour of the authorities. All in all, the conditionality principle laid down in the non-
paper did not appear to be working as no improvements took place regarding the main 
issues.23 
 
21  Reuters New Agency: interview with President Alexandr Lukashenko. 2 Feb 2007. Accessible: www.president. 
gov.by/press49990.html#doc (6.2.2007). 
22 Commission Decision on the ENPI Annual Action Programme 2007 in favour of Belarus to be financed 
under Article 19 08 01 03 of the general budget of the European Communities. Accessible: 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/documents/aap/2007/ec_aap-2007_by_en.pdf (13.10.2010). 
23  For a detailed analysis of the results of the conditionality approach, see: http://pdc.ceu.hu/archive/000054 
33/01/mo042009en.pdf.  
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2.2  The turning point - August 2008 
The war in Georgia in August 2008 brought a definite change in the whole EU 
Neighbourhood Policy. Instead of seeking direct confrontation with Russia, the EU 
decided to intensify its policies towards the common neighbourhood. As stated in the 
Presidency Conclusions of the Extraordinary Council Meeting held on 1 September 2008, 
the EU “decides to step up its relations with the eastern neighbours.”24 
Belarus noticed the change, and as a move of goodwill, all political prisoners were 
released in the second half of August 2008, including former presidential candidate 
Alexandr Kazulin. Benita Ferrero-Waldner declared on behalf of the EU:  
This news comes at a critical time as Belarus prepares for parliamentary elections next 
month. I very much hope the positive momentum will continue and allow the European 
Union and Belarus to rapidly develop closer relations25  
In reality, the positive momentum did not continue since the parliamentary elections on 
28 September were just as undemocratic as they “usually” are in Belarus. No opposition 
candidate was able to gain a seat in parliament, despite some earlier hopes. 
Nevertheless, the EU had re-started the dialogue with the Belarusian authorities. The 
first step was the six-month suspension of the visa ban against almost all Belarusian 
officials, including Lukashenko himself, but excluding Lidiya Yermoshina, Head of the 
Central Electoral Committee of Belarus, who was held responsible for the anti-democratic 
nature of the elections. Altogether, the ban on 36 of the 41 officials included on the list 
was suspended.26  The Belarusian leadership expressed its readiness to renew technical 
cooperation with the EU during the visit to Minsk by Hugues Mingarelli, Deputy Director 
of DG External Relations, on 5/6 November 2008. It mentioned three main areas: food 
safety, contacts between financial institutions and the harmonization of food safety 
regulations.27 A few days later, on 13 November 2008, Head of Presidential 
Administration Uladzimir Makey declared that the Belarusian leadership was interested 
in cooperation with the EU on all levels.  
The financial crisis that started in autumn 2008 seriously affected the Belarusian 
economy; and rising Russian energy prices contributed further to the problems. It thus 
became especially important to attract as much foreign investment as possible in the 
longer term, while, in the shorter term, the regime aimed at obtaining a large loan from 
the IMF. In order to gain support from the IMF, Belarus also did its best to further 
improve relations with the EU. 
 
24  Presidency Conclusions of the Extraordinary European Council. Brussels. 1 September 2008. Accessible: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/102545.pdf (12.10.2010). 
25  Benita Ferrero-Waldner today welcomes the release of Andrei Kim and Siarhei Parsyukevich. Office for a 
Democratic Belarus. 20 Aug 2008. Accessible: http://democraticbelarus.eu/node/ 4822 (13.10.2010). 
26  EU preparing to renew Belarus sanctions as election looms.  EUobserver.com. 27 Sept 2010. Accessible: 
http://euobserver.com/9/30895 (14.10.2010). 
27  EU Wants to Cooperate With Belarus in Three New Areas. 5 November 2008 Accessible: 
www.istockanalyst.com/article/viewiStockNews+articleid_2772304.html (9.11.2009). 
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In an attempt to demonstrate the goodwill of the regime, the state distribution 
monopolist Belsayuzdruk was again allowed to distribute the opposition newspapers 
Narodnaya Volya and Nasha Niva from November 2008. After the publication of the first 
version of the Eastern Partnership document, which was favourable to Belarus, the 
Lukashenko regime permitted the registration of the “For Freedom” movement of former 
presidential candidate Alexandr Milinkievich on 17 December 2008. The EU responded 
by launching two extensive assistance programmes on environmental assistance and food 
safety in 2008 and 2009 respectively. 
The recommendations of the ILO had also mentioned the need to improve the 
situation of small and medium-sized enterprises. As this actually overlapped with the 
government’s intentions to intensify domestic economic growth, a tax reform was 
introduced in October and a presidential decree issued in December simplifying the 
system of import duties. 28 On the other hand, on 10 November 2008, Lukashenko signed 
a particularly repressive law on information sources that seriously limited independent 
media. In addition, a month later, police arrested several young activists who had 
organized a commemoration of the anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. 
Though the elections on 28 September 2008 fell short of international standards, the 
EU still continued the process of renewing its relationship with Belarus. Besides the 
above-mentioned release of political prisoners, another key motive was the fact that 
Belarus refused to recognize the “independence” of Abkhazia and South-Ossetia, despite 
strong pressure from Russia. This was very much appreciated by the EU. In fact, this non-
recognition was a precondition for Belarus’s inclusion in the Eastern Partnership, as was 
openly stated by Czech foreign minister Karel Schwarzenberg in December 2009:29 “If 
they recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia, it would create a very, very difficult situation 
for Belarus because Belarus would be out of the European consensus.” Minsk did not 
recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia and thus finally became included in the Eastern 
Partnership project. On the other hand, this non-recognition became a serious breaking 
point in Russia-Belarus relations. Moscow had expressed hopes from the very beginning 
that Minsk would recognize the two break-away republics, but this did not happen.  
Minsk has clearly been aiming at winning time and playing the EU and Russia off 
against one another for more than two years now. As far as Moscow is concerned, the 
issue of non-recognition may have arisen during the negotiations when Russia decided 
not to deliver the final 500 million USD of a 2 billion loan to Belarus in June 2009. On 3 
August 2010, President Dmitry Medvedev, speaking at the summit of the Commonwealth 
of Independent States, said that Lukashenko had promised to recognize the two 
“republics”, but he had not fulfilled his commitments. On 2 October 2010, Lukashenko, 
 
28  EU and Belarus in the Fourth Quarter of 2008: Analysis and Monitoring. Belarusian Institute for Strategic 
Studies. 01/2009 (29.1.2009).  
29  EU warns Belarus not to recognize separatist regions. The New York Times, 3 Dec 2009. Accessible: 
www.nytimes.com/2009/02/23/world/europe/23iht-union.4.20381388.html (10.10.2010). 
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speaking at a news conference held for Russian journalists, openly declared that Minsk 
should have recognized the two territories, and in fact was willing to do so. The only 
problem was that Moscow was not prepared to compensate Minsk for the losses it might 
suffer due to worsening relations with the EU following this recognition.30 
2.3  From the Eastern Partnership to the January 2011 EU sanctions 
The Eastern Partnership (EaP) project of the European Union originates from a Polish-
Swedish proposal prepared in 2008. Following several modifications, the Eastern 
Partnership was finally launched at the Prague Summit in May 2009. Though there were 
intense debates on whether to invite Belarus, Minsk was finally included in the Eastern 
Partnership initiative, probably also thanks to its consistent policy of non-recognition of 
the two break-away republics. As a preliminary gesture, the visa ban was again 
suspended for a further six months in March 2009. Thus Lukashenko theoretically 
became able to participate in the Prague summit in May 2009. Lukashenko quickly made 
good use of the opportunity provided by the suspension of the visa ban and visited Italy in 
April 2009, where he met both Pope Benedict XVI and Silvio Berlusconi.31 However, in 
order to avoid a scandal, Belarus was finally represented at the Prague summit not by the 
President but by Prime Minister Sergey Sidorski.  
As far as content is concerned, the Eastern Partnership proposes both bilateral and 
multilateral actions. Bilaterally, the EaP promotes new association agreements, 
agreements on Comprehensive Deep Free Trade, long-term visa liberalization, energy 
security cooperation, institution-building programmes as well as regional development 
projects. Multilateral programmes are aimed at sharing EU experiences on reforms and 
promoting EU legislation and standards. The following thematic platforms were agreed: 
democracy and human rights; good governance and stability; economic integration and 
convergence with EU policies; environment, climate change and energy security; contacts 
between people. In addition, six so-called flagship projects were also launched, for 
example an integrated border management programme, diversification of energy 
supplies, etc.32  
 
30  Abkhazia: Belarus  Recognition Likely to Come? Belarus News and Analysis. 4 Oct 2010. Accessible: 
www.data.minsk.by/belarusnews/102010/36.html (10.10.2010). 
31  Lukashenko, Berlusconi discuss Belarus rapprochement with Europe. Belarus News and Analysis. 28 April 
2010. Accessible: www.data.minsk.by/belarusnews/042009/206.html (10.10.2010). 
As a response, Berlusconi returned the visit in November 2009, thus becoming the first president from an 
EU Member State to meet Lukashenko bilaterally for a long time. For more information, see: Lukashenko 
interpreted the Berlusconi visit as a gesture of EU backing. President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko 
regards Berlusconi's visit as sign of Italy's support in international politics. TVR.by 1 Dec 2009. Accessible: 
http://www.tvr.by/eng/president.asp?id =20896 (10.10.2010). 
32  For a detailed official presentation on the Eastern Partnership, see: www.eeas.europa.eu/eastern/docs/ 
eastern_partnership_road_shows.pdf (15.10.2010).  
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From the institutional point of view, there are biannual Eastern Partnership summits 
and annual meetings of the foreign ministers of the EU and the partner countries. In 
addition, an inter-parliamentary assembly, Euronest, was set up involving the European 
Parliament and the parliaments of the Eastern partners. A Civil Society Forum was also 
organized in order to represent the civil societies of the partner countries.  
The Civil Society Forum aims at strengthening the role of civil society in the targeted 
countries by promoting contacts between them and by facilitating their dialogue with the 
local authorities. The activities of the Civil Society Forum are financed by the European 
Commission. The Civil Society Forum of the EaP held its first meeting a year later, in 
November 2009, and elected its Steering Committee. More than 200 civil society 
organizations participated: approximately 140 of them were from the EaP region, while 
others were from EU countries.33 Four working groups were set up at the first forum to 
address the main challenges that civil society has to face in the EaP countries. The topics 
of the working groups corresponded to the topics of the four thematic platforms of the 
EaP. All four working groups produced draft recommendations that were later further 
elaborated by the elected working group coordinators. The second Civil Society Forum 
meeting was held a year later in Berlin in November 2010 and overviewed developments 
in the four working group areas and elaborated further recommendations.34 
Belarus was included in all the EaP programmes and thus became a fully fledged 
member, although originally there were plans to only partially include Minsk in a 5+1 
framework. However, it must be added that participation by the Belarusian state in EU 
assistance programmes is still hampered by the lack of the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement. Without a PCA, Belarus is not a fully fledged member of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy and thus cannot fully benefit from the European Neighbourhood 
and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) programmes.  
The opportunity to participate in the Eastern Partnership means different things for 
the Belarusian state and for the opposition and civil society. For the state, the EaP 
provides an opportunity to demonstrate the strong political ties between the EU and 
Belarus which Minsk can rely on during its debates with Moscow. Furthermore, the 
bilateral and multilateral projects offer possibilities to conduct infrastructural, technical 
and environmental developments in the country, though the lack of a PCA is a crucial 
hampering factor. 
The benefits of EaP accession are much more important for Belarusian civil society. 
Participation in the work of the Civil Society Forum also provides a certain legitimacy and 
protection back at home, at least as far as those major NGOs which were present at the 
Forum are concerned: the Belarusian Association of Journalists, the Belarusian Helsinki 
Committee, etc. They are also able to improve their contacts and connections with other 
 
33  First meeting of the Civil Society Forum (16-17 November 2009). European Union External Action. 
Accessible:http://eeas.europa.eu/eastern/civil_society/first_csf_meeting_2009_en.htm (15.10.2010). 
34  Second meeting of the Civil Society Forum (18-19 November 2010) – BERLIN. European Union External 
Action. Accessible: http://eeas.europa.eu/eastern/civil_society/second_csf_meeting_2010_en.htm (20.11.2010).  
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civil society organizations, both from the Eastern Partnership region and from the EU. 
Moreover, they also have the opportunity to represent Belarus in some way in the work of 
the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly, although this is not an easy issue as will be 
discussed later in detail. 
However, inclusion in the EaP did not seem to have a significant effect on the regime. 
Repressive measures were continued without any visible sign of improvement. New cases 
of political imprisonment were even to be seen in February 2009 – when Belarus’s 
participation at the Eastern Partnership summit was only being discussed – with the 
arrest of three leaders of protesting entrepreneurs. These arrests were followed by another 
case in June 2009, when an activist of the opposition movement “Young Front” was 
sentenced to imprisonment. After a year spent in preliminary custody, Mikalai 
Autokhovich, one of the businessmen arrested in 2009, received a five-year sentence in a 
highly non-transparent criminal case in May 2010.35 
An important warning signal from the EU to Minsk was that the first meeting of the 
Euronest Parliamentary Assembly had to be postponed in March 2010 as no agreement 
could be reached on who should represent Belarus. While Minsk wanted the country to 
be represented by its parliament, the EaP adopted a decision that the ten Belarusian 
mandates should be given to representatives of opposition organizations and NGOs.36 The 
decision was first postponed until after the April local elections in Belarus. However, 
Euronest decided not to recognize the legitimacy of the Belarusian parliament following 
the local elections on 25 April 2010, during which once again no opposition candidates 
received a mandate. Thus the participation of Belarusian MPs in the organization is 
currently blocked.  
Numerous other events also took place which demonstrated the dissatisfaction of the 
West over the failure of Belarus to improve the human rights situation. In April 2010, the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe suspended its high-level contacts with 
Minsk in response to two cases involving the death penalty in March.37 Also in April, the 
ILO again highlighted the violation of workers’ rights in Belarus – at the same time as an 
event called “Belarus Investment Days” was held in Geneva to promote Belarus to foreign 
investors.38 In May, the OSCE together with the EU extensively criticized a more 
restrictive than ever, new law on the use of the Internet.39  
 
35  New names in the political prisoner list of Belarus. www.humanrightshouse.org (11.5.2010). Accessible: 
http://humanrightshouse.org/Articles/14202.html (11.10.2010).  
36 First Meeting of EURONEST Parliamentary Assembly Postponed. Office for Democratic Belarus. 18 
March 2010. Accessible: http://democraticbelarus.eu/node/8554 (11.10.2010). 
37  PACE suspends high-level contacts with Belarus. Belarus News and Analysis. 29 April 2010. 
http://data.minsk.by/belarusnews/042010/235.html  
38  Belarus Violating Workers’ Rights. Belarus News and Analysis. 28 April 2010. Accessible: 
http://data.minsk.by/belarusnews/042010/215.html (11.10.2010). 
39  OSCE media freedom representative criticizes pressure against independent media in Belarus, offers to 
support discussion of new Internet legislation. Euronest.blogspot.com  19 May 2010. Accessible: 
http://Euronest.blogspot.com/2010/05/osce-media-freedom-representative.html (11.10.2010). 
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The document entitled “Taking Stock of the European Neighbourhood Policy”, which 
was launched on the fifth anniversary of the ENP in May 2010, used rather moderate 
wording about the results achieved in Belarus. In fact, it only mentioned the lack of a visa 
facilitation agreement, the existence of an Energy Memorandum of Understanding and 
the problem of the death penalty.40 Thus Stefan Füle, EU Commissioner for Enlargement 
and Neighbourhood Policy, was also in a difficult situation when he had to evaluate the 
performance of Belarus on the first anniversary of the Eastern Partnership. On 14 May 
2010, he declared that though he did not regret allowing Belarus to join the initiative and 
expressed readiness to cooperate more closely, “engagement depends on the Belarusian 
leadership’s position on human rights and fundamental freedoms.”41 Füle continued to 
use the same wording during a speech delivered at the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly 
on 10 June 2010. He encouraged further engagement with Belarus, stressing that isolation 
did not produce any results, and declared that free and fair elections would be on the top 
of his agenda during his visit to Minsk.42  
It would appear that the EU agenda on Belarus is still based on the situation of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms even though the regime has not shown any readiness to 
conduct fundamental changes in this field. For instance, at the time of finishing this 
report, it is already obvious that the presidential elections in December 2010 were no less 
fraudulent than previous ones. Besides, the regime brutally cracked down the opposition 
protests held in Minsk on the eve of the elections. More than 600 opposition activist were 
arrested, including two presidential candidates and many foreign journalists. One of the 
opposition candidates, Uladzimir Neklyayev was heavily beaten by unidentified attackers, 
and was later arrested directly in the hospital and taken to prison from there. Though 
most of the arrested opposition demonstrators were released after 10-15 days of 
administrative detention, approximately 30-40 of them are still in prison and are going to 
face a trial. If sentenced, they could be imprisoned even for fifteen years. When OSCE 
protested against the way of conduncting the presidential elections and also against the 
behavior of the authorities, in late December the regime ordered the OSCE representation 
to be closed down. At this point, the human rights-based conditionality of the EU’s policy 
towards Belarus is being seriously questioned by the sheer lack of visible improvements.  
As an answer to the suppression of the opposition protests in Minsk on 19 December 
2010, the EU decided to introduce sanctions against Belarus on 31 January 2011.43 The 
 
40 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. Taking stock of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy. COM(2010) 207. 12 May 2010. Accessible:  http://ec.europa.eu/world/ 
enp/pdf/progress2010/com10_207_en.pdf (10.10.2010). 
41 EU Enlargement Commissioner Says Eastern Partnership ‘Absolutely A Success’. RFERL, 14 May 2010. 
Accessible: www..rferl.org/content/EU_Enlargement_Commissioner_Says_Eastern_Partnership_ 
Absolutely_A_Success/2042264. html (19.10.2010). 
42 Commissioner Fule encourages full engagement with Belarus. Euronest.blogspot.com. 10 June 2010. 
Accessible: http://Euronest.blogspot.com/2010/06/commissioner-fule-encourgaes-full.html (10.10.2010). 
43  Council Conclusions on Belarus. Council of the European Union, 31 Jan 2011. Accessible: www.consilium. 
europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/119038.pdf (2.2.2011). 
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travel ban that was earlier suspended against Lukashenko and many other Belarusian 
leaders was reinstated and also extended. Currently altogether 158 Belarusian officials are 
on the visa ban list. Freezing their bank accounts held in the EU was also ordered. Besides, 
the EU has decided to intensify relations with ordinary Belarusian people and the civil 
society.  
The above mentioned lack of improvements in the field of human rights can easily be 
verified by using quantitative methods to draw up a balance on how the closer 
relationship with the EU and the internal reforms conducted by the government have 
changed Belarus in terms of political and human rights in recent years. Improvements in 
these fields have been declared crucial from the perspective of cooperation with the EU; 
on many occasions, they were even declared virtual preconditions (for example, regarding 
the suspension of the GSP benefits).  
Three quantitative sources, three quantitative indexes, which have been compiled by 
international NGOs, show the same results. The Polity IV Project44 of the Center for 
Systemic Peace and Colorado State University, the “Democracy Index” of the Economist 
Intelligence Unit45 and the Freedom House “Freedom in the World” project46 all 
demonstrate that no lasting, structural improvements have taken place in terms of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms since 2006.  
From these results, one may conclude that all recent measures on the part of the 
Belarusian government that were communicated as being liberal were only of an ad hoc 
character and neither indicated nor generated structural changes. In simple terms: the fact 
that the regime releases political prisoners once, as it did in 2008, does not give any 
guarantee that no one will be imprisoned for political reasons later, such as it happened 
after 2009. Another example could be the handling of opposition media: if the regime lifts 
the ban on the publication of an opposition journal, as it happened with the newspapers 
Nasha Niva and Narodnaya Volya in 2008, this alone does not mean that the legal 
environment has been changed in a way that such bans cannot be imposed later. The 
regime’s fluctuating attitude towards the Polish minority is a perfect example: the 
treatment of the Poles in Belarus has constantly been subject to developments in bilateral 
Polish-Belarusian relations, regardless of any EU efforts to foster minority rights in 
general. No structural progress has taken place despite the fact that the country has 
improved its relationship with the European Union, has also been included in the Eastern 
 
44 Polity IV Project. Brief description. Center for Systemic Peace and Colorado University. Accessible: 
www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm (15.10.2010). 
45  The Economist Intelligence Unit Index of Democracy 2006. Available: http://www.economist.com/ 
media/pdf/DEMOCRACY_INDEX_2007_v3.pdf (15.10.2010). 
The Economist Intelligence Unit Index of Democracy 2008. Available: http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/ 
Democracy%20Index%202008.pdf (15.10.2010). 
46  Freedom in the World. Freedom House. Available: http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15 
(2.12.2010). 
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Partnership initiative, and has made the improvement of Western contacts an integral 
part of its multivectoral foreign policy.  
On the other hand, studying quantitative indicators might also lead to the conclusion 
that the EU’s policy towards Belarus has seemingly failed in terms of protecting and 
fostering human rights and civil freedoms. Practically no structural changes have taken 
place. Some of the government’s ad hoc measures were accepted by the EU – such as the 
release of political prisoners or the more moderate handling of opposition 
demonstrations – and certain benefits were thus granted to Minsk, as seen earlier in this 
chapter. Some other measures were not accepted, as happened with the trade unions, but 
the sanctions imposed such as the suspension of the GSP preferences did not hit the 
regime particularly hard so that it can live with them and continue to impose the 
measures that have come under criticism.  
3.  The EU as an economic partner of Belarus 
This chapter examines the economic contacts between the EU and Belarus. The main 
question is whether and to what extent Belarus can rely on the EU in terms of counter-
balancing Russian economic dominance. Three aspects of this question will be studied. 
Following a short introduction, the first aspect is the role and share of the EU as a foreign 
trade partner of Belarus. The second aspect is the role of the EU and Western Europe as a 
source of investments. Special attention will be paid to the particularities of the inflow of 
capital into Belarus. The third part focuses on the EU and the West as sources of credit 
and loans to the Lukashenko regime.  
3.1  The crisis of the Belarusian economic model 
Sustaining social stability is of crucial importance for the Belarusian leadership. This 
social stability is the factor which has indeed ensured strong domestic support for the 
Lukashenko system over the last decade. Numerous social achievements of the Soviet 
system have been preserved in Belarus such as free education, free health care, relatively 
high pensions compared to other CIS countries, etc. Belarusian officials have repeatedly 
stressed that this social stability is to be maintained – or, at least, radical cuts are to be 
avoided. Efforts by the regime to protect the population from the consequences of rising 
energy prices are an integral element of this strategy. 
One has to admit that it has proved possible to more or less maintain this social 
stability even under the circumstances of the economic crisis. According to a recent non-
state survey presented in Minsk in June 201047, society has not been affected to a 
significant extent by the crisis. While basically 2/3 of the population felt the negative 
 
47  Social impact of the global financial crisis. Belarusian Institute of Strategic Studies and IMP Research 
Center. Accessible: www.belinstitute.eu/images/doc-pdf/Data_crisis_en.pdf (15.10.2010).  
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effects of the crisis, only some 15% of the respondents said that their material well-being 
had deteriorated significantly in the last 12 months. Of course, painful steps were taken, 
such as the 20% devaluation of the Belarusian ruble in January 2009, which was the 
precondition for a 2.5 billion IMF loan. Nevertheless, the population could still be 
protected to a large extent. 
This policy of maintaining social stability meant that Minsk has been in growing need 
of external sources of funding since the oil and gas price war at the turn of 2006/2007. 
Although the measures taken to intensify foreign trade and attract more investments 
produced impressive results, this alone was not enough to make up for the income lost 
due to rising energy prices. Thus a growing number of external loans and credits are also 
needed to sustain the social stability that guarantees the stability of the system. The result 
is a peculiarity of the indebtedness of the Belarusian state: the newer credits are not being 
spent on structural economic reforms, but are being used to maintain the standard of 
living and social stability in the country, while still avoiding radical reforms and cuts. 
3.2  The EU as a foreign trade partner 
Trade relations between Belarus and the EU countries improved dynamically until 2008. 
Since 2008, there has been a significant decrease in EU-Belarus trade due to the economic 
crisis. The decrease particularly affected Belarusian exports of steel and textile products to 
the EU, as these sectors were also affected by the suspension of the GSP benefits. Exports 
of fuel and mining products also fell by almost half from 2007 to 2009. This was 
connected with the rise in Russian oil prices. As import prices from Russia rise, it 
becomes less and less profitable from the Belarusian perspective to re-export petroleum 
products to the European Union – although this re-export was considered one of the 
engines of the “Belarusian economic miracle in the early and mid-2000s”.48 
 
  
 
48  Zlotnikov, Leonid: The Belarusian ’economic miracle’ – illusions and reality. FISCHER, Sabine (ed.): Back 
from the Cold? The EU and Belarus in 2009. Chaillot Papers No. 119. Paris, November 2009. EU Institute 
for Security Studies, p. 77. 
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Figure 1: Trade of Belarus with the EU in 2005-200949 
 
 EU share in total 
BY exports 
[%] 
EU share in total 
BY imports 
[%] 
Balance 
[million EUR] 
Total 
[million EUR] 
2005 44.7 21.6 2,825 8,669 
2006 46.3 22.6 3,256 11,247 
2007 43.9 21.9 3,203 12,289 
2008 43.6 22.0 3,731 15,435 
2009 38.9 25.0 415 10,270 
 
As seen from the official EU DG Trade statistics, the EU plays a very important role in the 
foreign trade of Belarus, being constantly Minsk’s second most important foreign trade 
partner with a 30.7% share. In terms of exports, Belarus has been exporting more to the 
EU than it does to Russia since 2007: the EU’s share is 38.9%, while Russia’s is 33.7%.50 Of 
course, a significant part of Belarusian exports to the EU consisted of fuel and mining 
products – still at 49.5% in 2009 despite the above mentioned decrease. As Belarus has 
practically no oil production of its own and its mining sector is also insignificant, these 
products originate mostly from the processing and re-export of oil imported from Russia.  
Another pattern also becomes visible when analyzing the share of individual countries 
in the foreign trade of Belarus. Namely the significant role that emerging economies play 
in the exports of Belarus. Brazil, India, China and Venezuela together have a share of 8.5% 
of Belarusian exports. This is almost equal to the position of Ukraine, a direct neighbour 
and partner in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). 
  
 
49  Belarus Trade Statistics 2009. Accessible: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/ docs/2006/september/tradoc_ 
113351.pdf (13.10.2010).  
50  Belarus Trade Statistics 2009. Accessible: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_ 
113351.pdf (13.10.2010).  
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Figure 2: The top 15 most important foreign trade partners of Belarus in 2008-2009, 
with EU countries listed separately51 
 
Country Share in total 
Belarus 
turnover  
Exports, 
million USD 
Jan.–Dec. 2009 
as compared to 
Jan.–Dec. 2008  
Imports, 
million USD
Jan.–Dec. 2009  
as compared to 
Jan.–Dec. 2008 
1. Russia 46.7% 6 692.0 63.8% 16 584.4 71.1% 
2. Netherlands 7.9% 3 680.4 69.1% 238.8 65.6% 
3. Germany 6.5% 984.6 121.4% 2 243.0 80.3% 
4. Ukraine 6.0% 1 692.8 61.1% 1 283.2 60.7% 
5. Latvia 3.6% 1 658.4 77.5% 111.7 80.9% 
6. Poland 3.3% 829.9 46.2% 831.4 72.0% 
7. China 2.6% 173.9 27.9% 1 121.8 79.3% 
8. Great Britain 2.0% 798.0 57.3% 200.5 74.2% 
9. Italy 1.8% 187.6 58.1% 707.0 81.1% 
10. India 1.3% 550.9 146.3% 115.9 99.3% 
11. Lithuania 1.3% 370.9 59.9% 257.5 110.2% 
12. Brazil 1.2% 486.2 40.6% 118.4 76.3% 
13. Kazakhstan 0.8% 312.8 87.0% 74.9 43.6% 
14. Moldova 0.5% 170.4 70.7% 84.6 91.4% 
15. Uzbekistan 0.3% 106.2 77.3% 23.0 77.0% 
 
Of the 27 EU countries, Belarus’s by far most important trading partners are the 
Netherlands (7.9% of total Belarus turnover), Germany (6.5%), Latvia (3.6%) and Poland 
(3.3%). Germany's second place is understandable, taking into account the country’s 
overall economic power and the prioritized role Eastern Europe enjoys in German foreign 
policy. The high share of Latvia and Poland is due to the fact that they serve as transit 
countries for Belarusian exports. However, the leading position of the Netherlands might 
be somewhat surprising, considering the fact that diplomatic relations between The 
Hague and Minsk are practically frozen. The Netherlands does not even have an embassy 
in Minsk; Dutch interests are represented through the Warsaw embassy. By contrast, the 
private and business spheres are seemingly much more active: according to the website of 
the Belarusian embassy in The Hague: “The Kingdom of the Netherlands is one of the 
biggest trade partners of Belarus in Europe. The strong emphasis is given to such spheres 
as agriculture, logistics, and high technologies.”52 Dutch human rights NGOs are also very 
active in Belarus. 
   
 
51  External trade. Export.by Information export support website. Accessible: http://export.by/en/bel_info/ 
o_belarusi/konomicheskii_kaleidoskop8c6/vneshnyaya_torgovlyacd6.html (15.10.2010). 
52  Belarus – The Netherlands. Embassy of the Republic of Belarus in the Kingdom of the Netherlands. 
Accessible: www.netherlands.belembassy.org/eng/bilateral/ (15.10.2010). 
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3.3  The EU and Western Europe as investors 
In order to overcome economic hardships, the Lukashenko regime has also been 
constantly striving to enhance the Belarusian economy since 2007, and especially to 
liberalize the investment climate. Several measures have been taken, of which clearly the 
most important was the abolition of the so-called “golden share rule”. This law made it 
possible for the state to take control of any joint stock company in which it had even the 
smallest share. This represented an intolerable risk for most foreign investors. The law, 
which continuously generated criticism, was finally abolished on 4 March 200853 in order 
to attract more foreign investors to the country. 
Liberalization has significantly contributed to the inflow of foreign investments. In 
2008, a total of 6.525 billion USD in foreign capital was invested in Belarus, which meant 
a 1.2 billion increase compared to 2007. The share of FDI in 2008 was 2.280 billion USD, 
which meant an almost 40% increase compared to the 1.769 billion in 2007. The most 
important foreign investors in 2008 and 2009 were: 
 
Figure 3: Main source countries of foreign investments in Belarus in 200854 
 
Foreign investments in Belarus in 2008 Share of FDI 
Country Amount 
[million 
USD] 
Share of all 
foreign 
investments 
[%] 
Country Amount 
[million 
USD] 
Share of all 
foreign 
investments 
[%] 
Russia 2167.0 33.2 Switzerland 1215.7 53.3 
Switzerland 1225.4 18.8 Russia 328.5 14.4 
Austria 739.8 14.5 Cyprus 263.1 11.5 
Great 
Britain 
713.9 10.9 Germany 93.7 4.1 
Cyprus 555.7 8.5 Great Britain 42.2 1.9 
  
 
53  Belarus abolishes golden share rule. 4 March 2008. Accessible: http://www.president.gov.by/ 
en/press53426.html (15.10.2010). 
54  О поступлении иностранных инвестиций в экономику Беларуси за 2008 году. Accessible: 
http://mfa.gov.by/ru/economic/investment/ba4c6a14a9f339cd.html (19.5.2009). 
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Figure 4: Main source countries of foreign investments in Belarus in 200955 
 
Foreign investments in Belarus in 2009 Share of FDI 
Country Amount 
[million 
USD] 
Share of all 
foreign 
investments 
[%] 
Country Amount 
[million 
USD] 
Share of all 
FDI [%] 
Russia 6067.0 65.3 Russia 4026.5 82.5 
Austria 931.7 10.0 Switzerland 353.1 7.3 
Cyprus 536.5 6.1 Cyprus 102.0 2.2 
Great 
Britain 
467.7 5.0 Germany 51.6 1.1 
Switzerland 371.2 4.0 - - - 
 
The inflow of foreign investments to the economy of Belarus accelerated further in 2009. 
Altogether more than 9.3 billion USD was invested, which meant a 1.4 times increase 
compared to the 2008 results.  
On the one hand, investments from Austria, Great Britain and Cyprus have decreased. 
On the other hand, Russia not only remained the most important investor, but the 
amount of Russian capital inflow almost tripled within the course of one year! Russia has 
remarkably increased its share in overall foreign investments from 33.2% to 65.3%. The 
change is even more spectacular in terms of FDI: while Russian FDI represented only 
14.4% in 2008, its share grew to 82.5% in 2009, which means an almost sixfold increase in 
one year. 
At the same time, the amount of capital originating from Switzerland has dropped 
considerably: in 2009 it was only about a quarter of the previous year’s value. Again, FDI 
inflow shows even more spectacular trends: while in 2008 more than 53% of all FDI was 
of Swiss origin, this figure dropped to 7.3% in 2009. Such large-scale falls are highly 
unusual. One probable explanation is that most of the capital (including FDI) that came 
from Switzerland was of Russian origin – and that with the continuing liberalization of 
the investment climate there is now no longer any need to use Swiss intermediaries.  
Another particularity that might support suspicions about the presence of non-
transparent investor structures is the dynamics of the FDI inflow into Belarus.56 
 
 
55  О поступлении иностранных инвестиций в экономику Беларуси за 2009 году. Accessible: 
www.mfa.gov.by/ru/economic/investment/ (13.10.2010). 
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Figure 5: FDI dynamics in Belarus in 2001-2008 (million USD) 
 
At a first glance, the dynamic increase between 2006 and 2007 could be interpreted as a 
spectacular success of the regime’s liberalization policies. However, one has to note that 
the highest increase in FDI inflow in 2006/2007 – it grew more than 500% – was well 
before the abolition of the “golden share” regulation, although that law was considered to 
be the biggest obstacle to foreign investors! Moreover, most liberalizing measures were 
not passed until 2008 or later. 
This particularity also seems to support the hypothesis that the decisive majority of the 
FDI inflow into Belarus at the time was not composed of real external capital that 
operated according to market-economy principles. Instead, it might be connected with 
Russian and Belarusian political elites who were well aware of the abolition of the “golden 
share” law in advance. (Why should Russian elites have been aware of the removal of the 
golden share rule, and not interested Western business people?) 
An interesting discrepancy emerges when one compares the main investment and FDI 
source countries (listed in Figures 3 and 4) with the main trading partners of Belarus 
(listed in Figure 2). It can be seen that only a few of the main investor countries appear on 
the list of main trading partners. The only two overlaps in Western Europe are Germany 
and Great Britain: in other words, these are the two countries which conduct intensive 
trade with Belarus and also conduct direct investments there. Of the other three Western 
European main sources of investments – Austria, Cyprus and Switzerland – the latter two 
are well-known for their liberal legal environment which allows the operation of highly 
non-transparent companies. Furthermore, one has to keep in mind that one of the main 
characteristics of direct investments is that the investor is usually rewarded with a certain 
controlling share of the given company.  
 
56  Based on the data of the Belarusian UNITER Investment Company and on their Macroeconomic 
Overview: Belarusian Economy: 2008 results, published in 2009. p. 13. Accessible: 
www.uniter.by/_modules/_cfiles/files/macro_2008_en_45.pdf (13.10.2010). 
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There have been numerous opposition claims that elements of foreign (direct) 
investments into Belarus are in fact connected to Belarusian and Russian business groups. 
According to this unconfirmed information, these investments already represented a kind 
of hidden privatization before actual liberalization started. The potential of the corrupt 
Belarusian bureaucracy to prevent these processes is questionable.57 The Slovak NGO 
Pontis Foundation already warned in 2007 of the dangers of less transparent, hidden 
privatization processes.58 In its analysis, the Foundation mentioned the example of the 
Belarusian mobile phone provider Velcom, which was sold first of all to a Cypriot 
company in 2007, before 70% of it was acquired by Telekom Austria Group only three 
months later.59 If one adds that the Russian telecommunication giant Sistema is currently 
planning to buy Telekom Austria Group60, then claims about the hidden transfer of 
Russian capital through Western countries to Belarus would not appear to be completely 
without foundation. In any case, it is worth remembering the outcry of first Vice Prime 
Minister Vladimir Semashko in February 2008: “Russian business wants to buy 
everything it can.”61  
All in all, the Belarusian policy of liberalizing the investment climate appears to be on 
course to backfire. Instead of attracting foreign investments from both the East and West 
in a balanced way, the inflow of Russian capital is clearly dominating the trend. 
3.4  The EU and Western Europe as creditors  
The Russia-Belarus relationship was less problematic in the early 2000s than it is today. 
Thus from 2003 to 2006, Belarus’s external debt was decreasing due to the economic 
growth which the regime was able to produce due to the privileged price of Russian 
energy. The turnabout came in 2006/2007, when the price of Russian gas more than 
 
57  In August 2008, Belarusian economist Leonid Zlotnikov noted in an interview given to Radio Free Europe 
that the real danger was not only in Russian capital, but also in the corrupt domestic bureaucracy which 
might “sneakily sell out Belarus for bribes”. Belarus’s Privatization Plan Reveals Change in Thinking. 
RFERL 25 Aug 2008. Accessible: www.rferl.org/content/Belaruss_Privatization_Plan_Reveals_Change_ 
In_Thinking/1193694.html (15.10.2010).  
58  The Regime Change(s). Survey of the Current Trends and Development in Belarus. Summer 2007. Pontis 
Foundation. Accessible: www.nadaciapontis.sk/tmp/asset_cache/link/0000017223/Pontis%20Survey%20 
The%20Regime%20Change(s).pdf (15.10.2010). 
59  Telekom Austria kauft sich in Weißrussland ein. Accessible: www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung/Telekom- 
Austria-kauft-sich-in-Weissrussland-ein-181521.html (15.10.2010). 
60  Russia’s Sistema to Acquire Telekom Austria? 1 April 2010. www.intomobile.com/2010/04/01/russias-
sistema-to-acquire-telekom-austria/ (15.10.2010).  
61  Syamashka: “Russian business wants to buy everything it can”. Accessible: http://charter97.org/en/ news/ 
2008/2/21/4060/ (15.10.2010).  
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doubled. Since then, the government has been relying on external financing to a growing 
extent.62 The figure below shows the growth of gross foreign debt between 2001 and 2007: 
 
Figure 6: Dynamics of the foreign debt of Belarus from 2001 to 200763 (Columns: 
external debt in billion USD. Line: external debt in share of the GDP) 
 
 
 
In line with its foreign policy of “standing on two feet”, Belarus is striving to obtain the 
necessary credits from both the East and the West. Minsk already started to negotiate a, 
1.2 billion USD credit with China in February 2007, which was finally delivered in the 
course of that year. The first larger loan from Russia of 1.5 billion USD was obtained in 
December 2007 in order to counter-balance the consequences of the rising price of gas. 
Another Russian credit of 2 billion USD followed in 2008, while the IMF also granted a 
2.5 billion stand-by stabilization loan on 31 December 2008. 64 Finally, the IMF loan was 
upgraded to 3.46 billion USD in spring 2010. On the other hand, Russia refused to deliver 
the last 500 million of its 2 billion loan due to the serious economic and political disputes 
between Minsk and Moscow – which also included the problem of the recognition of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Since then, the foreign debt has kept growing rapidly and, 
according to the data of the National Bank, reached the total of 23.171 billion USD in July 
 
62  Shymanovich, Gleb: Belarus external debt: Sustaining Levels in a Time of Global Crisis. Belarus Public 
Policy Fund. Minsk, 2009. pp.3. Accessible: www.nadaciapontis.sk/tmp/asset_cache/link/0000022758/ 
0906_Belarus_Analysis_BelarusExternalDebt.pdf (16.10.2010). 
63  Макроэкономическое обозрение состояния экономики Беларуси. ИТОГИ 2008. UNITER 
Investment company. www.uniter.by/_modules/_cfiles/files/macro_2008__rus_44.pdf 4 Aug 2009. 
(14.10.2010). 
64  IMF loan to step up stability of Belarus economy. BelTA. 31 Dec 2008. Accessible: http://www.belta.by/ 
en/news/econom?id=317709 (2.1.2009). 
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2010, which is equal to 45% of the GDP.65 Thus the external debt has practically 
quadrupled in the course of five years since the start of taking out huge loans and credits; 
it increased more than threefold compared to the GDP. 
By July 2010, the amount of state debt was 8.479 billion USD, thus practically one 
third of all foreign debt was state debt. In the previous year, the state debt had been 7.891 
billion USD, an increase of around 10% from 2009 to 2010. Belarus’s main creditors are 
Russia, Venezuela, Germany, the United States, the IMF and the World Bank.66 
Another problem is the risky composition of the Belarusian debts. The country’s 
foreign debt structure is characterized by short-term debts, mainly trade loans, which 
have particularly high servicing costs, especially under the circumstances of the global 
economic crisis. A possible way out, for example by increasing the share of long-term 
lending from abroad, is hampered by the lack of transparent financial accounting.67 (The 
low rate of financial freedom is explicitly demonstrated by Figure 7.) 
All in all, the need to attract increasing external funds strengthens the influence of 
Russia, on the one hand, as Moscow is by far the largest creditor of Belarus. On the other 
hand, together with the principle of “standing on two feet”, it also guarantees the 
continuation of the economic opening-up of Belarus towards the West, as the regime 
intends to maintain a balance in its external dependencies.  
3.4.1  Non-Western creditors and investors – an alliance of autocracies emerging?  
One has to add that a “third foot” is also emerging in Belarus’s foreign and economic 
policy, namely the developing world. Minsk has been striving to strengthen political and 
particularly economic ties with countries like Venezuela, Iran and China. Until recently, 
these efforts had produced only marginal results: for instance, Venezuela provided a 500 
million USD loan to Belarus in December 2008 with a seven-year repayment term, and 
technical cooperation projects were also launched, including projects aimed at the 
military industry. However, the trend is changing rapidly: in October 2010, Belarus and 
Venezuela signed a contract on deliveries of 2.5 million tons of Venezuelan oil to Belarus 
(which also received support from Lithuania, which will serve as a transit country with 
shipments through the port of Klaipeda.68) The possibility of the appearance of 
 
65  Gross foreign debt of Belarus has reached 45.5% of GDP. Ibelarus.eu 15 Sept 2010. Available: 
http://ibelarus.eu/?p=1234 (15.10.2010). 
66  Belarus’ foreign debt down 0.7% in July to $8.479 bln. PriorBank. Accessible: http://www.priorbank.by/e/news/biz/42895/ 
(15.10.2010).  
67  SHYMANOVICH, Gleb: Belarus external debt: Sustaining Levels in a Time of Global Crisis. Belarus Public 
Policy Fund. Minsk, 2009. pp.3. Accessible: www.nadaciapontis.sk/tmp/asset_cache/link/0000022758/ 
0906_Belarus_Analysis_BelarusExternalDebt.pdf, p. 7-8 (16.10.2010). 
68  Lithuania and Belarus come to terms on Venezuelan oil transit. 18 Oct 2010. Accessible: www.baltic-
course.com/ eng/transport/?doc=32520 (20.10.2010). 
The EU and Belarus engaged – no wedding in sight 27
 
   
Venezuelan oil on the Belarusian – and also on the Ukrainian – market also started to 
worry Russia.69 
As far as China is concerned: in March 2010, Beijing promised to provide Belarus with 
a 1 billion USD loan to be spent on bilateral cooperation projects, and promises were also 
given regarding 7.5 billion USD in the form of non-repayable aid.70 According to the 
information of the Business New Europe magazine, the overall value of the loan deal 
package that was agreed during Lukashenko’s visit to Beijing in October is 15 billion 
USD. This sum includes infrastructure projects to be realized in Minsk using Chinese 
money.71  
These signs indicate that Belarus’s gradual re-orientation from the Russia-West axis to 
a real multivectoral policy has started to deliver first results. Both the appearance of 
Venezuelan oil in Eastern Europe and the inflow of Chinese capital pose a challenge to the 
strong position of Russia. Moreover, to a certain extent they also decrease the importance 
of Europe as a possible alternative or counter-balance to Russian dominance. 
3.5  Economic freedom – winds of (limited) change 
In contrast with the static, stagnating situation of human rights, some changes in the 
economy are indeed visible when one uses quantitative indicators. As sources, the analysis 
relies on the Index of Economic Freedom, compiled by the Heritage Foundation and 
various indexes of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). 
The Index of Economic Freedom is based on measuring ten parameters, each on a 1-
100 scale, composed of several sub-questions. The ten main parameters monitored are: 
business freedom, trade freedom, fiscal freedom, government spending, monetary 
freedom, investment freedom, financial freedom, property rights, freedom from 
corruption and labour freedom. Some of the factors measured are also connected to the 
broader sphere of human rights and democratic norms, such as property rights or 
freedom from corruption. From this perspective, Belarus’s performance in the last few 
years is more than interesting due to its asymmetric nature: 
  
 
69  For example, see: Полный Каракас в Украине. Реалистичность планов Чавеса–Лукашенко–
Януковича весьма сомнительна. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 20 Oct 2010. Accessible: www.ng.ru/cis/2010-
10-20/1_karakas.html (20.10.2010). 
70  China promises 1 bln loan to Belarus. RIA Novosti. 25 March 2010. Accessible: http://en.rian.ru/world/ 
20100325/158303977.html (20.10.2010). 
71  “Business New Europe”: EU and US won’t support last dictator of Europe. Business New Europe. 20 Oct 
2010. Accessible: www.charter97.org/en/news/2010/10/20/33115/ (20.10.2010).  
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Figure 7: The performance of Belarus according to the Index of Economic Freedom72 
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2010 48.7 72.1 80.3 85.5 32.0 62.6 20.0 10.0 20.0 20.0 84.8 
2009 45.0 63.7 67.2 79.4 30.9 66.8 20.0 10.0 20.0 21.0 70.8 
2008 45.3 58.8 52.2 81.0 55.5 66.2 20.0 10.0 20.0 21.0 68.6 
2007 47.0 55.7 67.2 81.8 60.0 61.5 20.0 10.0 20.0 26.0 68.2 
2006 47.5 54.4 67.2 78.9 33.2 49.8 30.0 30.0 30.0 33.0 68.2 
 
Business and trade freedom have improved significantly between 2005 and 2010, 
especially over the last two years. Development was limited in terms of monetary and 
fiscal freedom, although the latter is still above the world average. (See Figure No. 8.) So is 
labour freedom, which shows that the country’s labour market also improved a lot last 
year, although it largely stagnated until then.  
However, practically no developments are visible regarding investment freedom, financial 
freedom, property rights and freedom from corruption. According to the index results, 
the regime remained largely unchanged in these aspects. In other words, the liberalization 
discussed before did not affect all sectors of the economy. Especially interesting is the 
consistent grading of investment freedom. It might show that despite the numerous 
government measures to attract foreign investments, the investment market has remained 
largely closed, restrictive and discriminative. Taking into account the large capital inflow 
that took place in the last 2 to 3 years and the continued restrictive character of the 
investment market, one can draw the conclusion that most of these investments probably 
happened in a largely non-transparent way, without free and fair competition. According 
to the Heritage Foundation analysis: “The government openly states that it wants to 
control all economic activity.”73 The largely unchanged – actually slightly worsening – 
 
72  Explore the data. Index of Economic Freedom. The Heritage Foundation. Accessible: www.heritage.org/ 
Index/Explore.aspx?view=by-region-country-year (17.10.2010). 
73  Ibid. 
The EU and Belarus engaged – no wedding in sight 29
 
   
corruption levels seem to support this statement regarding the general lack of 
transparency in the business sphere. 
 
Figure 8: Belarus’ ten economic freedoms in 2010, compared to the 2009 ratings74 
 
A similar picture is seen if one studies the indexes of the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development. The EBRD provides analyses of processes in certain 
economic sectors, such as enterprises, the financial sector and markets and trade. Though 
the data for 2010 is not yet available, some changes are indeed already visible: 
 
Figure 9: Performance of Belarus according to the EBRD indexes75 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
EBD index of small-scale privatization 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3
EBRD index of large-scale privatization 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.7 1.7
EBRD index of enterprise reform 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.7 1.7
EBRD index of price liberalization 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 3.0
EBRD index of forex and trade liberalization 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3
EBRD index of competition policy 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
EBRD index of banking sector reform 1.7 1.7 2.0 2.0 2.3
EBRD index of reform of non-bank financial 
institutions 
2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
 
 
74  Belarus information on economic freedom. Index of Economic Freedom. The Heritage Foundation. 
Accessible: www.heritage.org/index/country/belarus (17.10.2010). 
75  Belarus: Key Developments and Challenges. Transition Report 2009. Transition in crisis? European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development. p. 144-147. www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/transition/ TR09.pdf 
(12.11.2010). 
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As seen from the indexes, changes between 2005 and 2009 took place particularly in the 
areas of large-scale privatization, enterprise reform, price liberalization and banking 
sector reform. For example, the registration of new enterprises was simplified, as were real 
estate transactions, etc. On the other hand, the EBRD report points out that the 
complicated tax system was the main hindrance factor in doing business in 2009.76 
All in all, the general hypothesis concerning the unchanged nature of the regime seems 
to be only partially true in terms of economic freedom. From the outside perspective, 
some general developments are visible, also represented by the country’s improving 
overall score (see Figure 9.), and improvements are spectacular in terms of business, trade 
and fiscal freedoms (see Figure 8). On the other hand, the continuing critical corruption 
situation and low level of investment and financial freedoms may show that instead of the 
government-communicated liberalization, some kind of controlled “marketization” is 
taking place, with state control remaining strong. 
 
Figure 10: Change of Belarus’s overall score according to the Index of Economic Freedom. 77 
 
However, looking at the situation from the perspective of the regime, one may say that, 
generally speaking, this model does not seem to have failed completely. According to the 
indicators, the opening-up policy has not affected all sectors of the economy, which 
means that efforts by the state administration to preserve control – especially over the 
investment climate and privatization – have been basically successful.  
This means that the European Union’s policies of pushing for market economy 
reforms and the adoption of EU standards have also been partially successful. They are 
successful because in some ways the Belarusian economy is seemingly coming closer to 
 
76  Ibid. p. 144. 
77  Belarus information on economic freedom.  Index of Economic Freedom. The Heritage Foundation. 
Accessible: www.heritage.org/index/country/belarus (17.10.2010). 
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liberal Western standards, especially in terms of business and trade freedoms. 
Nevertheless, the above-mentioned shortcomings are important warning signals: despite 
some sectoral developments, the regime’s overall economic characteristics have remained 
largely unchanged. Belarus is still very far from being an open, liberal market economy. 
According to the analysis of Belarusian economist Leonid Zlotnikov, the main purpose of 
the reforms is to allow such a degree of economic freedom as is necessary to keep social 
dissatisfaction under control. 78 As President Lukashenko himself put it: “It is the state’s 
and the president’s most prominent task to control three things: power (which is 
impossible to privatize), property and money.”79  
On the other hand, the signs may also be interpreted to indicate that the Lukashenko 
regime is definitely ready to conduct changes in the economic sphere. In terms of political 
and civil freedoms, no structural improvements are to be seen at all, despite pressure from 
the EU. The regime seems to be resisting and is trying to “out-manoeuvre” the EU with ad 
hoc instead of structural steps. Minsk has continued doing this despite all the political and 
economic hardships it has suffered due to the worsening relationship with Russia, rising 
energy prices, etc. One should have no illusions: the Lukashenko regime is not willing to 
“give in” in the spheres of human rights and political freedoms, not even to a lesser extent. 
This has been demonstrated extensively over the last four years. However, the prospects 
of further development and cooperation are definitely much brighter in the sphere of the 
economy.  
4. Conclusions and recommendations 
All in all, the question is still there: Judging by its results, has the conditionality-based 
approach of the EU’s foreign policy towards Belarus failed? From the perspective of 
Belarus, relations with the EU have definitely become closer in recent years, both 
politically and economically – until, of course, the suppression of the opposition protests 
after 19 December 2010, discussed later. The turning point was the August 2008 war in 
Georgia. Since then, the EU has transformed its approach towards the post-Soviet region 
in general, and so towards Belarus. The earlier policy of isolation and sanctions has been 
replaced by a policy of engagement. An important step in this reconciliation was the 
suspension of the travel ban on Belarusian leaders. As a result, the political dialogue 
between Belarus and the EU has been intensified, and numerous technical assistance 
programmes have been launched. Belarus was also included in the EU’s Eastern 
Partnership initiative, although not as a fully fledged member. This was not possible 
because the country still does not have a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with 
 
78  ZLOTNIKOV, Leonid: The Belarusian ‘economic miracle’ – illusions and reality. FISCHER, Sabine (ed.): Back 
from the Cold? The EU and Belarus in 2009. Chaillot Papers No. 119. Paris, November 2009. EU Institute 
for Security Studies, p. 77. 
79  Quoted by: ZLOTNIKOV, ibid. 
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the EU. Negotiations on the PCA were suspended in 1995 due to anti-democratic 
domestic developments in Belarus. 
This shift in EU policy towards engagement fit perfectly with the general 
multivectoral, balancing strategy which has been characterizing Belarusian foreign policy 
in recent years. Minsk managed to tighten contacts with the European Union without 
actually complying with any of the EU’s demands concerning human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. The EU could not prevail even over such a relatively marginal 
question as the suspension of the death penalty, although this would have actually been a 
‘cheap move’ for the regime. Numerous other policy fields could also be mentioned where 
the regime managed to resist conditionality-based pressure from the EU: the situation of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms has not improved, nor have electoral standards 
or the freedom of the media. The December presidential elections did not make any 
changes in this respect, and the human rights situation became only worse. All in all, the 
main characteristics of the regime have remained unchanged in all these areas. 
The only exception is the economy, where results are ambiguous. Minsk has indeed 
conducted a certain opening-up process and passed a number of liberalizing measures 
(privatization has been started, although in a strictly state-controlled way, etc.). However, 
these measures have attracted far less capital from the West than was intended. Instead, 
the inflow of Russian capital is dominating the Belarusian investment market to a rapidly 
growing extent. Minsk’s ‘multivectoralist’ efforts were not particularly successful in this 
respect, as the liberalization measures actually seem to be strengthening Russian influence 
instead of helping to counter-balance it. 
The first chapter of the current study examines the political contacts between the EU 
and Belarus between 2006 and 2010. The main finding of the research is that, despite the 
launch of the conditionality-based EU engagement in 2005 and the inclusion of Belarus in 
the Eastern Partnership in 2009, practically no improvements have taken place in the field 
of human rights and democratic freedoms, although these were the very conditions for 
the EU’s engagement.  
This, on one hand, confirms the hypothesis set out in the introduction, namely that 
Belarus has managed to intensify its relationship with the EU without introducing any 
significant changes in the political nature of its regime. Thus the answer to the first 
research question of the extent to which human rights-based conditionality has failed is: 
Practically no improvements have taken place. 
On the other hand, the second chapter shows that the EU is a key trading and 
investment partner for Belarus and that the Lukashenko regime is indeed prepared to 
introduce liberal changes in the field of the economy and trade in connection with the 
above mentioned efforts to open up the economy. These factors altogether lead to the 
following recommendations. 
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4.1 Policy recommendations to the European Union: 
1. Taking into account the strategic need of the regime to cooperate with the EU, the 
economy appears to be the area on which the European Union should focus when trying 
to deal with the Lukashenko regime. Due to increasing pressure from Russia, Minsk in 
any case needed to start liberalizing and marketizing its economy in order both to fulfil 
the IMF requirements necessary for further loans and attract foreign investors. The 
European Union should try to make use of this domestic momentum. The human rights 
dialogue should, of course, not be abandoned since protecting human rights and 
fundamental freedoms is a core value of the entire European Union, including its 
Neighbourhood Policy. This is particulaly true following the 19 December 2010 events. 
However, strategic efforts are to be concentrated more on the broader economic sphere: 
either supporting the reform of the Belarusian economy by various means, from business 
cooperation and investment projects to increased technical assistance, or hitting it hard in 
case of non-compliance by suspending the payment of loans, etc. All in all, conditionality 
has not failed as a strategy towards Belarus, but it should become more balanced. Instead 
of a solely human rights and democracy-dominated approach, in the long run EU 
conditionality should focus also on economic and administrative aspects. Such a shift 
could also be applied in case the EU decides to introduce additional, stronger sanctions. 
All in all, also economic tools should be used for protecting human rights. 
 
2. Technical types of cooperation seem to work well since they meet the intentions of 
the regime to cooperate. These are mostly non-politicized questions which are of interest 
both to the EU and Belarus (border demarcation, Chernobyl-related assistance projects, 
etc.) – meaning that Minsk does not have to make political compromises that would 
endanger the stability of the regime. Thus fostering further technical cooperation might 
be a policy through which the EU could both improve its own security and also exert a 
certain influence on the Lukashenko regime. The flagship projects of the Eastern 
Partnership provide perfect opportunities to include Belarus in issues which are also of 
interest to Minsk. This would allow closer approximation between the EU and Belarus 
and would support the adoption of EU regulations and standards to an increasing extent 
– provided, of course, that Minsk would be ready to comply in the issue of political 
prisoners. 
 
3. Conditionality concerning visa issues should be simplified. It should be separated 
from the general political developments described in the non-paper and tied much more 
to the technical details and cooperativeness of the Belarusian authorities, for example 
their willingness to curtail illegal immigration, to improve border management practices, 
etc. This is especially true following the visit of Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaité 
to Minsk, during which a visa facilitation agreement of high symbolic importance was 
reached. The Lithuanian and Belarusian presidents agreed that those residents of their 
countries who live closer than 50 kilometres from the border can travel visa-free to the 
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other country to a distance of a maximum of 50 kilometres, Vilnius included. This small 
window opened by Lithuania could easily be widened to represent a door towards 
Belarus: an EU-level visa facilitation regime would supposedly be the best tool to engage 
not only the Belarusian elite, but also the people as a whole. Ukraine, Moldova and 
Georgia already have visa facilitation agreements with the EU, so does Russia. Moreover, 
an action plan for a visa-free regime was approved for Ukraine on 26 October 2010. Visa 
facilitation negotiations with Armenia and Azerbaijan are to start, probably at the turn of 
2010/2011. Under such circumstances, it would appear counter-productive to continue 
excluding Belarus from the visa facilitation dialogue while all other Eastern neighbours 
have either been given visa facilitation or negotiations are about to start. In addition, 
simplifying the visa regime for ordinary Belarusians and maintaining the visa ban against 
the targeted officials could well go together. Such a differentiated move would fully be in 
line with the EU intention to intensify relations with ordinary Belarusians and civil 
society, as described in the 31 January 2011 decision. 
 
4. However, when discussing these engagement opportunities, the EU should 
communicate clearly that with the suppression of opposition protests the red line has 
been crossed. As a condition for lifting the sanctions imposed January 2011, Minsk has to 
release all political prisoners. It should also be declared that in case of non-compliance, 
the EU would be ready to suspend even the existing political ties (including the 
participation of Minsk in the Eastern Partnership). As we have demonstrated, economy is 
the area where the EU indeed possesses leverage.  
 
5. If the EU were to introduce strict economic sanctions against Belarus, the regime 
would face two choices. It could turn to Russia. This would imply; however, that Russian 
political and economic influence increases even more – a prospect that Lukashenko tried 
to avoid with his policy of “standing on two feet”. If Minsk would be forced even to 
recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, this would seal Belarus off 
from the West for a long time. The other option is that Minsk, in order to avoid complete 
dependance on Russia, it would have to accept Western demands. As elections are already 
over, and the political opposition is still very fragmented, the release of political prisoner 
would not mean any serious risk for Lukashenko. Thus, it appears rather likely that Minsk 
will try to return to the status quo ante – the pre-election situation, when the EU treated 
Belarus generally as a partner. 
 
6. In order to secure concessions from Minsk the EU should threaten to impose 
severe economic sanctions – or, at least start to publicly speak about doing so. 
Furthermore, the EU should take care not to be deceived by any Belarusian dilatory 
efforts (for example, releasing only some political prisoners). Setting clear and achievable 
demands supported by strong economic and political pressure would supposedly lead the 
EU-Belarus relations back to the status, as it was before the presidential elections. The 
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situation then was, of course, not satisfactory. However, such an outcome would be better 
than the current stalemate or the option of Belarus turning fully to the East. 
 
7. When considering these steps, one has to keep in mind that a third vector is 
emerging in Belarusian foreign policy besides Russia and the EU, namely a group of 
authoritarian countries composed of China, Iran and Venezuela. These states are 
providing various forms of economic aid to Minsk in exchange for business and political 
concessions. Their increasing economic and political presence in the direct 
neighbourhood of the EU is indeed a matter of concern that is to be taken into account 
when designing the EU’s policy towards Belarus. In the short run this third vector would 
not be able to counter-balance the negative effects of any strong EU economic sanctions. 
However, in the long run this factor must not be ignored. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the 
official position of either the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt or the Hungarian 
Institute of International Affairs. 
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